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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM . 
STS-26 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER POST FLIGHT 
STRUCTURAL ASSESSMENT 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This report is an account of the post-flight structural assessment of the STS-26 
Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) .  The inspection was performed in Hangar AF of the 
Cape Canaveral A i r  Force Station on the John F. Kennedy Space Center in Florida, 
from September 30 to October 11, 1988. 
The purpose of this document is two-fold. First, it is  a record of the condition 
Secondly, it is intended to be a guideline for future of the boosters after this flight. 
post-flight structural assessments of the SRBs.  
2.0 SUMMARY 
Overall, the boosters were in good condition structurally. 
problem was the damage to the Integrated Electronic Assembly (IEA) box cover. 
appears to have been caused by water impact, and is not a next flight issue. 
The only unforeseen 
This 
There are some other issues that warrant further investigation. A redesign of 
these components may be necessary. 
1) Blast containers - Four of the eight containers did not function properly. 
The problem needs to be understood before a redesign is initiated. 
2)  Stiffener rings - A determination needs to be made if damaged rings are 
acceptable. 
a "fuse" and allowed to fail? 
Do the rings have to meet structural requirements or  are they considered 
3) Ordnance ring - The linear-shaped charge housing was damaged severely 
This condition should be investigated for possible due to the blast pressure. 
redesign. 
4) SRM stiffener ring stubs - Three cracks were found on the stiffener ring 
stubs. This is mainly a reuse issue. 
3 . 0  COMPONENT EVALUATIONS 
3.1 Aft Skirt Assembly 
3.1.1 Aft Skirt Structure (Reference Figure 1) 
The left and right aft skirts were visually inspected for signs of damage. The 
areas checked and their respective conditions were : 
HOLDDOWN POST #5 
\ +z HOLDDOWN POST #6 NOTE: 
LEFT AFT SKIRT 
SHOWN. FOR 
RIGHT SKIRT 
POST 5 = 1 
POST 6 = 2 
POST 7 = 3 
POST 8 = 4 
C RlTlC AL WELD 
CRITICAL 
\ INNER CAP FILLET 
OUTER CAP FILLET 
TYPICAL RING SECTION 
Figure 1. Aft Skirt structure. 
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1) 
weld areas so that they could be inspected. 
weld regions. 
on the left aft skirt however. 
interface at approximately the elevation of the aft ring centerline. 
and subsequent non-destructive evaluation (NDE) will determine if this presents a 
problem. 
Post-to-Skin Welds - Insulation was removed from the lower portions of the 
No cracks were observed in any of the 
A slight meridional scratch was noticed on the left side of post N o .  7 
The scratch was located adjacent to the weld/forging 
This was reported 
2) Interior Rings - The aft side inner and outer flange-to-web fillets were 
inspected for cracking and/or deformation. 
observed. 
Rib N o .  48 of the left skirt was found. 
deformation may have occurred. United Space Boosters, Inc. (USBI) agreed to 
request that further NDE be performed in this area. Gouges were also observed in 
the outer cap fillet of the right skirt at Rib  No. 14.  They appeared to be due to 
assembly or TPS removal and USBI agreed to document them on a problem report. 
No cracks or obvious deformation were 
A paint crack approximately %in. long in the aft ring inner cap fillet at 
This indicates that yielding or  excessive 
3) Ring-to-Skin Fasteners - Sealant caps were in place over all of the 
fasteners. There was no evidence of sheared bolts on any of the rings. 
4) Gussets - Each gusset was visually checked and showed no sign of 
buckling. 
5) Horizontal and Vertical Tabs - The connections of the hold-down post tabs 
to the aft ring were checked and no sheared fasteners were found. 
6) 
improper stud ejection) and the tension post footpads showed no obvious signs of 
dishing. 
Forging - The footpad holes showed no signs of broaching (caused by 
7)  Kick Ring Bolts - All of the inner and outer kick ring bolts were in place.. 
Sealant covered each bolt, thus precluding further inspection. 
8) Forward Ring Weld - Foam covered the inside surface of the weld and 
insulation covered the outside, thus preventing an inspection. 
3.1.2 Thrust Vector Control (TVC) System (Reference Figure 2) 
The TVC hardware was inspected and no signs of structural damage were found. 
Particular attention was given to the adjust0 bolts and lugs that secure the lower 
frames to the aft ring; the fuel supply module (FSM) guard and attach brackets; the 
hydraulic reservoir guard and attach brackets; and the exhaust duct. 
3 . 1 . 3  Aft Booster Separation Motors (BSMs) (Reference Figure 3) 
The aft BSM support structure was inspected and no damage to the frames was 
observed. All bolts were also in place. 
3 . 2  Blast Container (Reference Figure 4) 
STS-26 was the first flight for the redesigned blast container with the debris 
containment device. No structural damage was observed in the container housing 
3 
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(ADJUST0 BOLT NOT SHOWN) 
EXHAUST DUCT 
Figure 2. Thrust Vector Control System hardware. 
Figure 3. Aft  Booster Separation Motors mounted on A f t  Skirt. 
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PLUNGER 
FRANGIBLE BOLl 
Figure 4. Blast Container w i t h  debris containment device. 
which sees a high pressure load from the pyro-technic blast. 
which hold the spherical washer in place, had some metal removed during the blast. 
Several interior clips, 
The plunger mechanism functioned properly at four of the eight posts and the 
hole in the bottom of the container was sealed. 
but material was missing from the container. This indicates that the hole was plugged 
sometime during the flight, not at the initial blast. At three other posts, a large 
piece of the nut prevented the plunger from seating and there was sufficient room for 
debris to fall out of the hole. Reconstruction of the containers and frangible nut 
pieces confirmed that material escaped from four of eight containers. 
At one post, the plunger was seated 
The failure of the plunger to plug the hole is  most likely due to two factors. 
The first is that initial stud vibratory acceleration, due to preload lost when the 
frangible nut breaks, is much greater than the acceleration of the plunger due to the 
spring force. 
the plunger and the bolt, the bolt sees an impact force as it contacts the plunger. 
This force may be greater than the tensile strength of the bolt. 
Since the bolt accelerates w i t h  the stud, and there is a gap between 
The other factor is that the broken frangible nut may be contacting the beveled 
sides of the plunger as it travels downward, thus jamming the plunger before it seats. 
These possibilities are being investigated as of this writing, and a redesign of 
the internal blast container components, to provide better performance, is forthcoming. 
5 
3 . 3  Systems Tunnel (Reference Figure 5)  
The systems tunnel of each SRB was visually inspected while the boosters were 
intact on the rail cars. 
removal. 
intact. 
not done. However, no obvious structural damage was reported. 
N o  damage was observed to either tunnel prior to cover 
The auxiliary K5NA tunnel that contained the field joint heater cables was 
A complete inspection of the covers and floorplates after cover removal was 
TYPICAL COVERS 
/ 
Figure 5. Systems Tunnel Covers. 
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I 3 . 4  Stiffener Rings (Reference Figure 6) 
The video tape of water impact showed a large geyser of water moving up one 
We hypothesized the left-hand booster stiffener rings would sustain more 
side of the left-hand booster. 
entry. 
damage. 
rings and their fasteners were in good condition. 
All three stiffener rings on the right-hand booster were damaged. 
list of the damage sustained. 
The right-hand booster had a smaller, less spectacular 
The complete opposite proved to be true. On the left side, the stiffener 
The following is a 
No structural damage was observed. 
1) Forward ring - The ring was bent radially inward approximately 0.50 in. at 1 the 160-deg location. 
this location. 
A 3-in. crack through the bolt hole was evident in the web at 
Also, 38 fasteners in the area had failed in shear. 
2) Center ring - The ring was bent radially inward approximately 0 . 2 5  in. at 
A 5-in. crack through the bolt hole was evident in the web at the 160-deg location. 
this location. A total of 30 fasteners failed in this area. 
3) Aft ring - The ring had a 7-in. crack through the bolt hole and continuing 
along the stiffener ring web. A total of 20 fasteners failed in this area. 
All three rings had local buckling on either side of the damaged area. 
this out-of-plane deformation of the web would occur about 20 deg away from the 
crack centerline. 
which put part of the web in compression. 
locations where cracks were observed on the motor case stiffener ring stubs. 
Typically, 
This buckling was caused by the inward displacement of the ring 
These areas corresponded to the same 
Permanent deformation was observed in many of the holes on all three rings in 
the vicinity of the cracks and buckled regions. 
a large in-plane load which was probably caused by cavity collapse pressure on the 
motor case. 
This indicates that the rings carried 
The insta-foam on the aft side of the three stiffener rings was missing from 
130 to 190 deg. This indicates that the water impact loads were high in this location. 
3.5 ET Attach Rings (Reference Figure 6) 
Prior to flight, three areas w e r e  determined to have low margins of safety, as 
shown in USBI ET Attach Ring Stress Analysis (USBI-ANAL-32-88). 
the systems tunnel splice, cap splices, and the strut  lugs. These sections were 
examined more closely during post-flight inspection. 
They include 
The ET attach rings were visually inspected prior to removal from the motor 
case and after disassembly. 
rings could be inspected. 
but in good condition. 
missing on the aft side. 
the rings. 
in the vicinity. 
three stiffner rings aft of the ET attach ring. 
by cavity collapse at water impact. 
Before removal, the condition of the insta-foam on the 
The foam on the forward edges was rough and discolored, 
N o  metal was exposed. Both rings had a section of insta-foam 
There was approximately 60 deg of foam missing, exposing 
This area was clean and not covered in soot as was the other hardware 
The missing foam location corresponded to the foam damaged on the 
Apparently the damage was caused 
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The hardware on the rings was in good condition. All of the splice plates and 
web-to-tang holes were inspected, and no cracks or deformation were evident. 
paint sealer between the cap and the web was checked for cracks, which would 
indicate relative motion between the parts,  no cracks were noted. Some of the 
fasteners in the critical splice areas were saved for metallurgical examination. 
Visually the fasteners appeared in good condition, without deformation. 
The 
Possible damage was seen on a right-hand SRB intercostal. Paint was missing 
from the intercostal and the adjoining web, appearing as if there was contact between 
them. 
The IEA cover was missing in this region, thus the intercostal was exposed to sea 
water during towback. Also, several cables were loose in this area and they could 
have contacted the intercostal. 
However, this could be the result of damage encountered during retrieval. 
The In-Harbor Tow Bracket on the left-hand SRB was bent forward about 1 in. ,  
also the six bolts which attach the bracket to the motor case tang were sheared. 
These bolts fasten the ET attach ring web to the tang. The adjoining lightning 
covers on the attach ring, which attach to the bracket, also sustained damage. This 
problem was the result of the SRB contacting the recovery ship during the retrieval 
process. 
hull. 
A s  the ship was negotiating a turn,  high swells pushed the SRB into the 
The ship's fenders, designed to prevent this situation, were not adequate. 
3.6 Aft IEA Box 
One of the IEA box side covers on the right-hand SRB was missing. This cover 
has the same circumferential location as the damaged stiffener rings. All 37 rivets 
which attach the side cover to the center cover had failed, also the twelve 0.25-in. 
bolts which fasten the side cover to the cap were sheared. The damage appears to 
have been caused by water impact. 
moving forward; this load is what would be expected during splash down due to the 
water spray. 
ring also suggest water impact. This area is exposed with the side cover off. The 
adjacent hardware is heavily sooted in this vicinity. Other damage was also evident 
as a result of the cover failure. The connecting lightning cover was bent and four 
fasteners had failed. Also, the center portion of the IEA cover was bent with three 
broken fasteners. 
The failed fasteners indicated that the cover was 
The cleanliness of the IEA box and the inside surfaces of the ET attach 
Figure 7 summarizes the damage to the IEA box area. 
3.7 Solid Rocket Motor Case 
The motor case segments visually appeared in good condition. There was no 
evidence of structural damage on the clevis or  tang. 
external surface of the motor case where paint was missing. 
were a maximum of 4 in.2. 
There were several areas on the 
Typically, these areas 
The ET attach ring stubs were inspected for cracks and hole elongation and 
none were evident. Three cracks were found on the right-hand SRB stiffener ring 
stubs. The aft ring stub had a crack at 142 deg, and the center stub had cracks 
at 186 and 188 deg. These cracks ran between the fastener hole and the outboard 
edge of the stub. 
stiffener rings. 
The location of the cracks corresponds to the buckled area of the 
9 
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3 . 8  Aft Attach Struts (Reference Figure 8) 
The SRB half of the upper, diagonal, and lower struts are separated into three 
components: the clevis, the strut  segment, and the barrel nut that connects the 
clevis to the segment. 
strut  segment is recovered as well as the SRB clevis attach pin. 
seen on all of the attach pins. 
pins were damaged. 
bearing surfaces of several strut segments. 
separation bolts. 
problem. 
The SRB half of the separation bolt which is internal to the 
Score lines were 
The lines were shallow so only the surfaces of the 
Also, some local deformation was seen on the edge of the flat 
The deformation was very slight and was not considered to be a 
These surfaces are in contact with the 
ET SIDE 
m 
SEPARATION 
2.250 DIA.- 
SRB SIDE 
NOTE: UPPER STRUT IS SIMILAR EXCEPT THAT THE 
SEGMENT HAS A 360" CABLE CONNECTOR FLANGE 
Figure 8 .  Typical Lower or Diagonal Strut. 
3 . 9  Forward Skirt (Reference Figure 9) 
N o  damage was observed to either forward skirt. The areas checked were: 
the dome, camera assembly, exterior thrust post, systems tunnel floor, interior skin 
lower clevis pin holes, the access door area, interior structural rings and beams, 
interior welds, and the weld between the access door J-stiffener and the upper ring 
web at the parachute attach point location. 
3 . 1 0  Ordnance Ring (Reference Figure 10) 
The structural parts of the ordnance ring appeared to function normally. The 
fracture plane was clean and no obvious deformation was seen in the lower pin holes 
that mate with the forward skirt.  
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THRUSTPOST 
W 
Figure 9. Forward Skirt Assembly. 
.215 THK.- 
LSC ASSY-TYP 
'I9 PLACES \(JOGRIFT HMX) 
TPS 400.0, 234 EO. SPACED 
Figure 10. Ordnance Ring Assembly. 
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The linear-shaped charge (LSC) housing of each ring assembly was severely 
damaged, however. 
of the ring. 
housing in many places and the housing holes were excessively damaged. 
The housing failed at numerous locations around the circumference 
Bolts that secure it to the ring pulled through the slotted holes in the 
The LSC housing is reinforced intermittently by backup plates. All of the 
damage was seen in the spans between reinforcements. 
add more backup plates to shorten the unreinforced spans. 
A possible fix would be to 
This condition has been observed on previous flights and is caused by the blast 
This is a concern because a loose piece of metal that size could possibly cut a 
pressure of the LSC. 
did. 
parachute line. 
None of the housing sections actually came off but some almost 
3 . 1 1  Frustum 
3 . 1 2 . 1  Frustum Structure (Reference Figure 11)  
The interior of each frustum was inspected and no damage was seen. Due to 
low margins of safety, shown in the USBI Frustum Stress Analysis (USBI-ANAL- 74-87) , 
a request was made to remove four bolts that connect the top ring of the frustum to 
the BSM support beam. These fasteners are loaded in tension during flight and wil l  
be sent to USBI-Huntsville for evaluation, following removal. 
the fasteners during the inspection, indicating that the bolts were still in place. 
Sealant caps covered 
3 . 1 1 . 2  Forward Booster Separation Motors (Reference Figure 11) 
The four motors in each frustum showed significant yielding in the flange around 
the edge of the nozzle exit cone. 
seen, however. 
yielding in the corresponding locations. 
the torque put on the ring by the opening of the exit cone cover at BSM ignition. 
No dimpling or  distortion of the nozzle surface was 
The end ring that bolts to the nozzle flange also showed significant 
This condition is expected and is caused by 
3 . 1 1 . 3  Isogrid Structure (Reference Figure 12) 
The isogrid structure in each frustum supports the m a i n  parachutes prior to 
deployment. 
frustum see a high inertial load at frustum separation. 
fitting were shown to have negative margins of safety in shear bearing in the USBI 
Decelerator Subsystem Stress Analysis (BPC-ANAL- 61- 87).  
sealant caps on several of these bolts were observed and a request was made to 
remove nine corner fitting bolts from each isogrid assembly so that the holes could 
be inspected for deformation. 
sent to USBI-Huntsville and MSFC for evaluation. 
The corner fittings that are part of the attachment of the isogrid to the 
Three fasteners at each corner 
Paint cracks around the 
USBI concurred with this request and the data will be 
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NOZZLE END RING 
Figure 11. Frustum with Forward BSMs. 
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VIEW A-A 
(TYP 3 PLACES) 
~ 
CRITICAL BOLTS ON CORNER FITTING 
Figure 12. Main Parachute Support Structure 
with parachutes in place. 
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